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Families run a large fraction of business groups around the world. In this paper, we analyze how the
structure of the families behind these business groups affects the groups' organization, governance
and performance. To address this question, we constructed a unique data set of family trees and business
groups for nearly 100 of the largest business families in Thailand. We find a strong positive association
between family size and family involvement in the ownership and control of the family business. The
sons of the founders play a central role in both ownership and board membership, especially when
the founder of the group is gone. The availability of more sons is also associated with lower firm-level
performance, especially when the founder is no longer present. We identify a possible governance
channel for this performance effect. Excess control by sons, but not other family members, is associated
with lower firm performance. In addition, excess control by sons increases with the number of sons
and with the death of the founder. One hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that part of the
decay of family-run groups over time may be due to a dilution of ownership and control across a set
of equally powerful descendants of the founder, which creates a race to the bottom in tunneling resources
out of the group firms.
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Family firms have attracted a lot of interest over the last few years. Recent 
research shows that the U.S. prevalence of dispersed ownership, with strong separation of 
ownership and control, is unusual. Instead, most firms around the world are likely to be 
part of a group of companies, linked together through common ownership. Often the 
ultimate ownership and control lies with a single family. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) show that a large fraction of public and private firms around the world are 
family-controlled. Family controlled firms often use pyramidal ownership structures to 
exert control over a large network of firms.
2 While family firms appear to be more 
prevalent in countries with weak minority shareholder protection, a number of recent 
studies show that family involvement is quite widespread, even in the U.S.
3 
 
But the finance literature so far has mostly treated the families behind business 
groups as monolithic entities. Most economic theories of family businesses focus on the 
role of families as second best solutions to imperfections in the financial markets, the 
market for corporate control or the market for managerial talent. See, for example, 
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2005). These models 
generally assume that trust relationships between family members can serve to (partially) 
solve principal-agent problems between owners and outside managers, if monitoring of 
managers is difficult. However, these theories typically ignore that families are 
constituted of individual members who have their own personal objectives and claims 
over the family businesses. The divergence in objectives might even lead to an erosion of 
trust within families, especially once the founder has passed control to the next 
generation.  
 
Our goal in this paper is to explore how these within-family dynamics affect the 
organization, governance, and performance of business groups. For this analysis we 
created a new data set that contains detailed information on the family trees – starting 
with the founder and following until the current generation – and the exact group 
structure of over 90 of the largest family groups in Thailand.
4 We have three main sets of 
findings.  First, we document in detail how control, management and ownership are 
allocated across different family members. The sons of the founder are central in 
ownership and control for these groups and substantially increase their role in ownership 
once the founder is gone. In groups where the founder had more sons, the sons hold a 
significantly larger fraction of the ownership and control rights of the group firms. In 
                                                 
2 Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that founding families are present in one third of S&P 500 firms 
and hold on average about 18% of equity in these firms. See also Claessens, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang (2000) for a study of family involvement in East Asian countries, and the work of the 
European Corporate Governance Network reported in Gugler (2001) for a similar study for 
European countries. 
3 See also Battacharya and Rabikumar (1999) and Pérez-González (2006). 
4 Our data sources do not allow us to determine which family members have died (we are able to 
do this for founders only after substantial additional work for each).  For this reason, measures of 
family size, number of sons, etc are measured from the start of the family business, unless 
otherwise noted.   2
fact, we find that sons “crowd-out” the ownership and control rights of other family 
members.  
 
Second, we show that larger families, more precisely families where the founder 
had more sons, are associated with lower firm-level performance. Family structure 
appears to be a major determinant of firm-level performance. This effect is especially 
pronounced when the founder is dead. In contrast we find that the relationship between 
firm performance and the number of daughters or number of other family members is 
much smaller and in most cases insignificant.  
 
Third, we identify a possible governance channel for these performance results. 
Families that have more sons tend to show a larger discrepancy between control and 
ownership rights (excess control), which is usually associated with poor governance and 
incentives for tunneling. The same increase in excess control cannot be found in families 
that have more daughters or other family members. Moreover, sons show higher levels of 
excess control once the founder is gone. A parallel relationship can be found for the 
organizational structure of the groups. Once the founder is gone, larger families are 
associated with larger groups (more firms in the group) and more pyramidal groups. 
Finally, we find that, controlling for family ownership, excess control by the founder’s 
sons is associated with lower firm-level performance, again especially when the founder 
is dead. The same effect of excess control is not found for other family members. This 
suggests that a family member’s ability to extract resources from a group firm depends on 
that family member’s position within the family hierarchy and not just whether he or she 
has a position on the firm board.  
 
One interpretation that emerges from our analysis is that the decay of family-run 
groups over time may in part reflect in-fighting for group resources as control becomes 
more diluted among rival family members, and in particular the sons of the founder.  If 
powerful insiders compete against each other this could lead to a race to the bottom 
where one brother tries to tunnel resources out of the firm before another brother does. 
These rivalries across family members seem to become more pronounced when the 
founder of the family group has more sons and when the founder himself is gone.  
 
However, we should stress that our analysis does not allow us to rule out 
additional explanations for the negative relationship between family size (and especially 
number of sons) and firm performance. A greater number of sons may lead to worse 
management decisions within the group if these family insiders crowd-out potentially 
more able professional managers.  In addition, the average quality of a son may be lower 
as the number of sons increases, because of the limited parental resources that have to be 
shared across a larger set of children. The founder might feel compelled to let his sons 
manage the group firms irrespective of their ability because of personal preferences or 
cultural inheritance norms, see Bertrand and Schoar (2006). 
 
There are a number of reasons why we focus our analysis on Thailand. First, 
Thailand is one of the few countries we are aware of where such detailed family structure 
data could be constructed with reasonable accuracy. For the major family groups now in   3
existence we were able to identify the founder who created the family business and to 
trace down the lineage of his children and future generations, in some cases for up to 5 
generations.  Second, there is a great amount of publicly available data for both publicly 
traded and privately held Thai family firms, which enables us to explore the role of 
private firms in more detail than is possible in many countries. Given the structure of 
business groups it is important improvement over previous studies that only relied on the 
public firms within the family groups. This data was collected for 1996, i.e. a year before 
the financial crisis.
5 For each of these business groups, we also constructed organizational 
charts that describe the network structure of the groups as of 1996. 
 
Our paper builds on several recent studies that document that family firms have 
on average lower stock market valuations and lower rates of return than non-family firms, 
however none of these studies have data on the private firms within the family groups 
(see for example Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002), or Conqvist and Nilsson 
(2003)). More recently, Pérez-González (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) show for 
U.S. firms that this negative performance effect is in large part related to the passing of 
active management and control from the founder to the descendants. Bennedson, Nielsen, 
Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2007) show a similar result for the case of small private 
firms in Denmark but are able to use gender composition as an instrument for the 
availability of male heirs. Our data allow us to go one step further and investigate the 
within family dynamics and the changes in governance structure that are associated with 
larger families and founder succession in business groups. But not all papers conclude 
that family firms perform worse on average. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
find higher performance for family firms in the U.S., while Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
show that business groups in India (which are for the most part family-controlled) on 
average perform better than stand-alone firms in matched industries. Morck, Stangeland 
and Yeung (2000) offer an explanation for the positive outcomes of family firms in some 
countries. If the government plays a central role in the economy, family connections may 
provide access to limited resources that in turn can lead to an even greater concentration 
of political influence in the hands of a few families.
6 
 
Our results are also related to the sociology literature on family groups that tends 
to focus more on detailed descriptions of within-family dynamics. For example, a number 
of sociological studies, relying for the most part on case studies, interviews or anecdotal 
evidence, have stressed the importance of cultural factors in explaining the emergence of 
family firms. Redding (1990), Jones and Rose (1993) and Whyte (1996) explore this 
argument in the context of Chinese families. These papers suggest that family traditions 
and inheritance rules might be central to the evolution of family businesses. They also 
highlight the possibility of conflicts within business families and how those might alter 
the direction and growth of the businesses.  
 
                                                 
5 In separate work, we look at the effects of the 1997-98 financial crisis on family group structure 
and performance. 
6 See Marman (2002) for a similar description of the emergence of family firms in South Korea 
and Israel.   4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some brief 
background information on Thai business history, including the evolution of family 
businesses. Section 3 explains how our data was collected on both families and their 
groups of firms.  Section 4 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 5 establishes that 
greater family involvement, particularly by sons of the founder, is associated with worse 
performance.  Section 6 presents our main findings and finally section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Brief Historical Background 
The Thai economy was integrated into the world economy in 1855 when the 
Bowring Treaty was signed between Britain and Siam. This treaty ended the King's 
monopoly power over international trade and lowered the tariff on exports and imports. 
In the wake of this increased openness European businesses entered Thailand, mainly 
through trading-houses, banks, and in the forestry, mining, and engineering sectors. Over 
the same period, the number of Chinese immigrants increased. Almost three million 
Chinese immigrants arrived in Thailand between 1882 and 1931. By the end of the 1920s, 
almost 12% of the total population of Thailand was of Chinese origin (Limlingan, 1986). 
Most of these immigrants were poor and worked as laborers in the growing export 
industries such as rice milling. But a number of these immigrants became entrepreneurs 
in various industries such as agriculture, trade, and mining, and started to expand their 
business extensively. The origin of some of the best-known business families can be 
traced back to this period (Suehiro, 1997). 
 
The revolution of 1932 marked the end of the absolute monarchy and led to an 
expansion of many family business groups that are important to this date. After the 
Second World War, Thailand entered a long period of successive military dictatorships 
that lasted until the 1970s. During this period, the government and military leaders 
became involved in business through share holdings or board participation in both state-
owned enterprises and private companies. These connections allowed the related 
companies to grow rapidly. The First National Economic Development Plan was 
introduced in 1961, which marked the beginning of the industrialization of the country. 
The manufacturing sector started to expand rapidly but was concentrated around few 
business groups that had connections with the banking sector and the government. The 
financial liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s created investment opportunities 
in real estate, telecommunication, and tourism and gave rise to new business groups that 
grew rapidly and eventually reached similar importance as the old groups in shaping the 
modern Thai corporate sector. 
 
3. Data 
The data for this project was collected from a number of different sources. In the 
following we will explain the data collection process in detail. 
 
a. Firms 
Each registered firm in Thailand has to submit annual financial statements, audited by an 
authorized auditor to the Ministry of Commerce. Registered firms include registered   5
partnerships, privately held limited companies, and publicly traded companies.
7 The 
financial statements of the largest 2,000 firms are published every year in a book series 
called Thailand Company Information (TCI). The criteria that TCI uses for including 
firms are (1) annual revenues of at least 200 million Baht (approximately eight million 
US dollars, using 1996 exchange rate), (2) listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, or 
(3) one of the leading companies in its industry. We collect this information for the cross 
section of all firms in 1996, since we wanted to capture the groups’ structures and 
organizations before the Asian financial crisis. In total, our sample contains 2,153 firms 
in 1996, which includes all publicly traded firms and the largest privately held firms in 
Thailand.  
 
The TCI database contains financial, ownership and board composition information at the 
firm level. For all firms, the financial information includes total assets, total liabilities, 
total revenues and net profits. The database also reports ownership data, the names and 
the percentage of company shares held by each shareholder, and the names of directors 
on the firm’s board. For publicly traded firms, specific positions on the board a particular 
person holds are also reported. The database provides information on industry 
classification similar to 1-digit and 2-digit SIC codes, and founding year for each firm. 
We supplement this data with direct requests made to the Department of Business 
Development in the case of missing information. We had to hand-collect the data for our 
business groups, since TCI only publishes this data in book format. 
 
For publicly listed firms, we can obtain additional information from the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET), SET’s Listed Company Info. This data is available in 
electronic format and distinguishes between consolidated and unconsolidated financial 
statements. We use unconsolidated financial statements in our analysis when looking at 
the outcomes of subsidiary firms within the group. 
 
b. Families 
To construct family trees for the family groups in our sample that are as accurate 
as possible we rely on a number of sources. We start at a publication by the Brooker 
Group entitled Thai Business Groups: A Unique Guide to Who Owns What., which 
covers the 150 leading business groups in Thailand and the history of each of these 
groups from the time the first business was founded. We then construct family trees for 
these business groups: For each of the family groups, we identify the founder and trace 
all of his direct descendants to the youngest generation that is active in business. We 
exclude family members that are younger than 15 years in 1996. We can infer this from 
the person’s title, since in Thailand people drop their junior title when they turn 15.  
 
Since the Booker book does not provide a full coverage of all family members we 
gather more detailed descriptions from alternative sources. First, when available, we 
collect family tree information from the funeral books published and distributed for the 
group founders or other family members. It is customary in Thailand when a public 
person dies that the descendants compile a funeral book that contains information about 
                                                 
7 The Department of Business Development was previously known as the Department of Commercial 
Registration until the government reorganization that became effective in October 2002.   6
the person's life and his or her family relationships. These funeral books are collected at 
the National Library in Bangkok. Second, we compile data from various biographical 
accounts written on Thai families. For example, Sapphaibul (2001a, b) provide detailed 
information on 55 of the most famous business families. We supplement the information 
with articles, obituaries, wedding announcements and anniversary celebrations of these 
businesses families in various local magazines and newspapers. The full list of the 
biography and funeral books as well as articles is provided in the data appendix. Finally, 
we conduct informal interviews with family members of a few business families to verify 
the accuracy of our data. 
 
The descriptive data are then systematically code in the form of family trees. We 
include in our family trees all of the family members we identify, whether or not they are 
involved in the family business. The founder generation is coded as generation one, his 
children are generation two, and so on. For each family member, we collect information 
on their specific position in the family tree (defined as the relationship to the founder), 
gender, birth order (defined as the rank order of children within a specific marriage), and 
biological vs. adopted status. We also code the information on individual education, 
working experiences, and involvement in family business, but these are less complete. 
We also rely on these sources to identify in which of the families the founder is still alive 
in 1996 and where an heir has taken over. Note that we cannot systematically track 
whether a given family member is still alive for most of the other family members. 
Finally, we collect the information on the name of the spouse(s) for each family member. 
This information is especially interesting for the founder, since several of founders have 
multiple wives and also children from multiple wives. We do not, however, count 
spouses as part of the family when we construct measures of family size. We carefully 
keep track of changes in last names, especially for married female family members and 
her descendants.  
 
Since we have to rely on secondary sources to construct the family trees, there is 
some concern about the completeness of this information. In particular, one might be 
worried that there is a bias in coverage of family members that are involved in business, 
while family members that are more private will not be mentioned in these sources. For 
that purpose, we have limited our sample to 93 families for which we can cross check the 
information using several different sources. But even for these families, there is still some 
concern that the information we have obtained may not be complete. For example, the 
coverage of female family members seems to be incomplete. Specifically, the fraction of 
females including all generations and adopted children is 38%. The fraction of females in 
the family trees excluding the first generation (the founders) and excluding adopted 
children is 42%. 
 
As an example, Figure 1 displays one of the family trees we have constructed 
based on these sources. The Bhirom Bhakdi family owns and manages a beer business in 
Thailand under the brand "Singha." Boonrwad Satrabutr started the family business in 
1932. Boonrawd is coded as the first generation in our data. He adopted Wit, who is a son 
of his brother, as his child. He later had two other sons, Prachuab and Chamnong, from 
his own wife. Wit, Prachuab and Chamnong are considered as the family's second   7
generation. There are eleven family members in the third generation: five males and six 
females. They are sons and daughters of Wit, Prachuab and Chamnong. 
 
Each individual in the family tree then has to be matched to the ownership and 
board composition data collected at the firm-level, allowing us to determine whether a 
specific family member is involved in the family business, in which capacity (through 
ownership and/or control) and in which firms. There are two major data challenges in 
performing this matching exercise. First, there are typically many different English 
spellings for a given Thai name, forcing us to do most of this matching by hand. Second, 
special care had to be taken in matching female family members to the ownership and 
board information as they may have dropped their maiden name after getting married. To 
alleviate any bias in matching that might result from the change in last name we also 
match all the daughters of a given family by first name only. This creates a unique match 
in all but one case, since in Thai culture it is very uncommon that two children within a 
family are given the same first name. Overall, we identify the firms that belong to each of 
our 93 business families. The criterion is that the family as a whole has the highest 
percentage of ultimate ownership in that company. Ultimate ownership is defined as the 
cash-flow rights derived from holding shares in the firm directly or indirectly through 
pyramids or cross-shareholdings. 
 
4. Descriptive  Statistics 
The Family: Table 1 provides a first overview of the business families in our 
sample.  We have detailed information on 93 families.  The data appendix explains 
precisely how we obtained our sample of firms, including how we ascertained that a 
family controlled a particular firm.  Taken as a whole, the 93 families in our dataset 
control more than 40 percent of all the assets in our 1996 sample of Thai firms. 
 
While the average family size is 12.9 members, there is wide variation in family 
size, where the largest family has as much as 122 members and the smallest has three.
8  
Note that we use here all family members in the family tree (but not children under age 
15 at the time of our study – it is impossible to ascertain exactly how many of them are 
present in most families). We include all family members in our calculation, regardless of 
whether we have evidence that they are involved in the business or not, since we would 
create endogeneity bias in the family size variable otherwise. Due to data limitations, 
family size does not include spouses or the founder’s siblings (and their descendants).  
In-laws are also excluded.  We were not confident in our ability to collect high quality 
data on these relatives across all families. 
 
There are two main sources of variation in family size: (1) the number of children 
each couple has, and (2) the number of generations that have passed since the founder 
started the business. On average, each family group has been around for 2.5 generations, 
with a minimum of 1 generation (three families), and a maximum of five generations 
                                                 
8 We directly address the skewness of the family size variable when moving to our empirical 
tests. We verify the robustness of all results to dropping the largest families or performing median 
regressions.   8
(only one family).
9 The vast majority of the families in our data have only 2 or 3 
generations. On average the number of male direct descendants of the founder is 9 and 
the total number of female direct descendants of the founder 5.9. The number of sons is 
3.3 and the number of daughters is 2.4. These calculations include the founder's children 
from all wives. For 72 out of the 93 families, we have been able to ascertain if the 
founder had more than one wife.
10  This was the case in 24% of the 72 families. Finally, 
we can document that the founder is dead in a little under half of the families in our 
sample (48%).  
 
Group Firms: Table 2 reports characteristics of the firms that these families own 
and operate. Every family in our sample controls at least one firm; 16 out of 93 groups 
control only one firm (for which we have data), while the remaining families control 
groups of firms.
11  The average family in our sample controls 6.56 distinct companies in 
1996. There is wide variation between families with the biggest family group owning 58 
firms. Since this family presents a large outlier in our group size distribution we rerun all 
our results in the following paper without this family and the results are robust to this 
omission. The average ROA of the groups is only 3% while leverage is almost 70%, 
measured as total liabilities divided by book value of total assets. The low average ROA 
and high leverage reflect the timing of the data, which was at the onset of the Asian 
financial crisis. On average the groups in our sample own 1.9 public firms and 4.7 private 
firms. To provide a better picture of the structure of the groups in our sample, we 
calculate the depth of the groups. "Depth" is measured as the largest number of vertical 
ownership links between firms within a group. We set the depth of firms at the top of the 
group structure as zero. For example, if firm A owns B and firm B own C, we calculate 
the maximum depth of the group as two. Table 2 shows that the average depth of the 
groups in our sample is 1.64, where the flattest groups have a maximum depth of zero 
(i.e., they are not pyramidal at all) and the deepest group has seven levels, i.e. seven 
layers below the firm at the top of the group.  We also calculate two more statistics on the 
complexity of the upstream and downstream ownership holdings within the groups. 
“Number of firms owning a particular firm” calculates the largest number of downstream 
ties of an individual firms in the groups, while “number of firms owned by a particular 
firm” describes the same for upstream ties. The values for these are 1.57 and 2.33 
respectively. 
 
                                                 
9 Eight families in our sample are 4 or more generations old. However, several second generation 
family members are still alive in these families. In fact, in 4 out of these 8 families, we identify 
2
nd generation members with ownership and/or board positions in 1996. We have replicated the 
main parts of our analysis by dropping those 4 families that are 4 or more generations old and for 
which we do not see 2
nd generation family members with ownership and/or board positions. The 
main regression results do not change. 
10 In some instances the founder had more than one wife at the same time, while in other cases the 
wives were consecutive.  We do not differentiate between these two kinds of multiple wife 
situations in our analysis. 
11 By our criterion of assigning a firm to the family with highest ownership, no firms in our 
sample are owned by, controlled by, or involve more than one family.   9
Involvement of Family Members in Family Business: Panel A of Table 3 reports 
the ownership structure of the firms across different family members and the second 
panel repeats this structure for the board positions of the family members. Table 3, row 
(1) shows that average family ownership is 45.2% in the firms in our sample and on 
average 6.23 family members have ownership stakes in at least one firm within the 
family group. The sons of the founder on average hold 12.6% of the outstanding equity in 
the group firms while the daughters hold only 5.5%.  About 1.4 sons on average have 
ownership in at least one of the group firms but only 0.8 of the daughters do. Overall, the 
fraction of family ownership held by the sons is 28% while the daughters own only 10% 
of the equity that is in the hand of family members. 
 
Panel B shows that the numbers are even more skewed for the distribution of 
board positions that provide control rights over the firm. The fraction of board positions 
held by the sons relative to the fraction of other family members with board positions is 
even higher, at 51%. In contrast, the fraction family ownership held by daughters of the 
founder is 10% and only 10% of daughters hold board positions.  
 
5.  Family Structure and Family Involvement in the Business 
As a first step toward understanding the role of individual family members in the 
performance and governance of the group firms we analyze the ownership and control 
positions of the different family members. We focus on two types of involvement: (1) 
board membership and (2) share ownership. We analyze how family involvement in 
business (board membership and ownership) varies with the size and composition of the 
family. The idea behind this analysis is to understand whether greater "availability" of 
family members is associated with more family members taking part in business. A 
possible alternative would be to select the same number of family members to run the 
firms, after choosing from a larger talent pool. 
 
a. Ownership  Structure   
For that purpose, in Table 4, we first compute for each family the number of 
family members who hold some ownership in at least one of the group firms. In column 
(1) we regress the number of family members that have some ownership in one of the 
group firms on the size of the family measured as the number of family members across 
all generations. These regressions are estimated at the firm level, but standard errors are 
clustered at the family (i.e., group) level to account for the fact that the decisions to 
involve family members could be made at the central group level and not at the 
individual firm. We also include dummy variables for the number of generations since 
the group was founded and a control for the age of the business group, measured as the 
year in which the oldest firm in the group was established.
12  
 
If the involvement of family members was not sensitive to their “supply” of the 
members, we should not see a relationship. However, we find a strong positive 
correlation between the size of the family and the number of family members who are 
involved in business. The estimated coefficient of 0.241 means that for every 4 additional 
                                                 
12 All results are robust to running median regressions or dropping the largest families from the 
sample.   10
family members one additional person will have ownership. In column (2) we show that 
even when we include a dummy variable whether the founder is dead we find literally no 
change in the coefficient on family size and the coefficient on the founder dead dummy is 
negative but not significant at all. This suggests that even if the founder is dead there is 
no significant difference in the overall holdings of the family members. 
 
But, these effects mask stark differences in the roles of different relatives of the 
founder, which we explore in the remaining columns of Table 4. For that purpose we 
break down ownership by the fraction of family ownership held by the sons of the 
founder, the daughters of the founders and the other family members (excluding the 
founder). In columns (3)-(5) we look at the ownership of sons as a function of the number 
of sons. Column (3) shows that the fraction of sons’ ownership increases sharply with the 
number of sons. Indeed, the estimated coefficient is 2.651 which economically quite 
larger. An extra son in the family is roughly equivalent to a 3% more of the group 
ownership in the hands of the sons. This suggests that the fraction of the group ownership 
held by the sons is closely tied to the number of sons in the family.  Interestingly, in 
column (4) when we include a dummy for whether the founder is dead, we find a very 
large positive and significant coefficient. The effect is equivalent to a 20% larger 
ownership stake be the sons in firms where the founder has died. This suggests that most 
of the shares of the founder go to the sons after his death. In column (5) we also include a 
control for family size. The coefficient on family size is negative but barely significant so 
that other family members have a minor crowed out effect on the sons. 
 
 In sharp contrast when we repeat the same analysis for the daughters in columns 
(6)-(8), we find no significant relationship between the number of daughters and their 
fraction of ownership in the group firms. Moreover, the holdings of daughters are not 
higher in families where the founder dead. We find similar result when looking at “other” 
family members (apart from the children of the founder) in column (9). There is no 
significant relationship between the share of family ownership held by other family 
members and by the number of other family members. However, there is a strong 
negative relationship between the number of sons in the family and the ownership for 
other family members. There is no such negative result for the number of daughters. Thus 
we see that sons heavily crowed out other family member but not their sisters. However, 
the sisters do not seem to hold much of the ownership to start with. 
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that the number of family members involved in 
business increases with the number of "available" people in the family. However this 
result is entirely driven by the sons of the founders. If the founder has more sons, they 
increase their ownership stake at the expense of other family members. Once the founder 
has passed away, the ownership stakes of the sons increase, while the stakes of other 
family members including the daughter of the founder do not. 
 
b.  Board Positions  
In Table 5 we repeat the regressions from Table 4 but where the dependent 
variable is the number of board positions held by various family members. Parallel to the 
family ownership, we find that involvement of family members on the board of firms   11
increases with the size of the family (column 1), and there is no significant change in the 
overall number of board positions when the founder is dead (column 2). As before, we 
find a very strong relationship between the number of sons of the founder and the fraction 
of board positions held by the sons (column 3). But in contrast to the effect of founder 
death on ownership the faction of board positions held by the sons is not significantly 
higher when the founder is dead (column 4). This difference to the ownership results 
suggests that the sons already assume board positions before the founder is dead, but 
ownership only passes on afterwards. Moreover, in column (5) we find that the number of 
other family members has a negative and significant (albeit small) relationship with the 
fraction of board positions held by the sons.   
 
In columns (6) to (8) we show that the fraction of board position held by 
daughters is positively related to their number in the family, but the relationship is much 
weaker than that for the sons. In column (7) we show that the fraction of daughters’ board 
positions is not higher in families where the founder is dead. And in larger families other 
family members reduce the share of board seats for daughters (column 8). Finally in 
column (9) we find a significant and positive relationship between the fraction of board 
seats to other family members and the number of “others” in the family. Again this is a 
contrast to the ownership results where a larger number of other family members did not 
result in a higher fraction of ownership. However, we again find that the coefficient on 
the number of sons is negative, indicating that sons crowd out board positions of other 
family members. 
 
One concern that we find the effects from founder’s sons and not from the 
daughters is that our data on daughters may be less complete than sons. However, given 
that the daughters included in our sample are more likely to be the ones with ownership 
and position, the regression coefficients for daughters should be positively biased, if 
anything. This is contrary to our results. 
 
6.  Real Effects of Family Structure on the Businesses They Run 
We now turn to the question of whether the differences in the size and 
composition of families are associated with differences in group performance. Several 
hypotheses have been put forward as to why we could expect lower performance for 
groups run by larger families. If family managers are less skilled than outside managers, 
greater involvement of family members will negatively affect performance. Larger family 
involvement might also lead to more infighting over resources and segregation of 
business lines across family members. I It is also possible that business families are faced 
with a quantity/quality trade-off. As the number of family members increases, the amount 
of resources that can be devoted to each family member declines, leading to lower 
average managerial quality. Under these views, a larger family would have worse 
performance at the group and firm level. 
 
On the other hand, one might conjecture that the market for corporate control and 
top executive talent is thin in Thailand. A larger family offers a deeper talent pool of 
potential managers to draw from. Moreover, if governance of professional (outside) 
managers is difficult to establish, relying on trust relationship along kinship lines might   12
be preferential since it could serve as a substitute for direct monitoring. These theories 
would imply that larger families would be positively related to group performance. 
 
a.  Family Structure and Firm Performance 
In Table 6 we study the relationship between firm performance and the structure 
of the families behind the firms.  Panel A presents regressions for all firms in the group 
and separately breaks out groups where the founder dead or alive. Panel B separately 
examines private and public firms. The unit of observation is a group firm (i.e., a firm 
that belongs to a family group). The dependent variable is residual Return on Assets 
(ROA), which we construct as follows. We first define firm ROA as the ratio of net 
profits in 1996 divided by the firm assets in 1996. We then regress firm-level ROA in 
1996 on one-digit industry codes and a control for the measure of the log of total assets of 
the firm. The residual ROA is computed as the residual from this regression. The 
estimation of residual ROA includes all firms in our dataset, not just the group firms. 
Therefore, residual ROA 1996 measures the performance of the firms net of industry and 
firm size effects.  
 
All regressions in Table 6 also include a dummy variable for the number of 
generations since the group was started and control for the age of the firm. Standard 
errors are clustered at the family-group level. In column (1) of Panel A, we regress 
residual ROA on the size of the family, measured as the number of people in the family 
tree. The coefficient on the family size is negative and not significant. However, when we 
include a measure for the number of sons in column (2) of Table 6, the coefficient on the 
number of sons is negative and highly significant. The estimated coefficient is -0.34. This 
means a one standard deviation move in the number of sons leads to a 1% decrease in the 
residual ROA of the family firms. This effect is quite large since all industry variation has 
already been taken out. The coefficient on the family size measure becomes in significant 
and very close to zero. In column (3), we add a dummy for the presence of sons from 
different wives (of the founder).  The coefficient on the multiple wives dummy is 
negative but not significant. In column (4) we add the number of daughters of the 
founder, and find a negative effect that is similar in magnitude to the effect of sons.  The 
presence of an additional daughter of the founder reduces residual return on assets by 
0.216. 
 
When we separate out firms where the founder is still alive versus those where the 
founder is dead, columns (5)-(8), we find a dramatic asymmetry in the results. In those 
firms where the founder is not alive anymore (columns (5) and (6)) we see a significant 
and robust negative relationship between performance and the number of sons, a 
somewhat smaller negative relationship to the number of daughters. In contrast, for firms 
in groups where the founder is still active (columns 7-8) we find a positive but not 
significant relationship between firm performance and number of sons. These results 
indicate that the negative relationship between firm performance and the number of sons 
(and to a lesser degree the number of daughters) is only present in families where the 
founder has passed away. In contrast while the founder is still alive the composition of 
the family does not appear to affect the performance of the firms. These findings are also 
consistent with previous studies such as Pérez-González (2006) and Villalonga and Amit   13
(2006), who also find that the performance of family firms is particularly poor once the 
founder is gone. 
 
In Panel B of Table 6 we separate family firms into those that are publicly traded 
and those that are private. When we compare the results for private and public firms in 
Panel B we find that the negative relationship between the number of sons and firm 
performance is approximately of the same magnitude in both types of firms. There is no 
evidence for a significant negative effect of daughters when we divide up the firms in this 
fashion. 
 
These results are interesting on a number of dimensions. They suggest that the 
lower performance of family firms is not uniformly due to a greater involvement of all 
family members if the family is larger. Instead, our results suggest that the sons of the 
founder may play a particular role, since the poor performance of family firms is mainly 
associated the number of founders’ sons in the family. The results are not consistent with 
the hypothesis that trust relationships among family members (in particular the sons) and 
the ability to draw from a deeper talent pool in larger families provides a source of 
comparative advantage to these families. These findings are instead more supportive of 
theories that suggest efficiency losses through greater involvement of sons. As we 
discussed before, an alternative explanation for this finding could be that family firms 
forgo the opportunity of hiring outsiders whose managerial skills might be much superior 
to those of family members; such a difference in managerial quality between family 
members and outsiders might be especially acute in larger families because of the 
quantity-quality trade-off in raising children. We unfortunately do not have data on the 
talent or educational background of sons, which could help us test this alternative story 
more directly. However, we do not think that this hypothesis is very plausible since these 
are some of the richest families in Thailand where the quality-quantity tradeoff would not 
be binding. Moreover, the results in the following section suggest that changes in 
governance structure do play an important role in the performance of group firms. 
 
b.  Governance and Family Structure 
 
A number of papers have documented that pyramidal group structures allow the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the shareholders of higher-up group firms by 
tunneling resources out of these firms, see for example Bertrand et al. (2001) or 
Claessens et al. (2000). A similar logic can apply even between family members or in our 
context even between sons of the founder. One plausible explanation for the lower 
performance of family groups with more sons is that the dilution of ownership between 
equally powerful sons increases the amount of tunneling from lower down group firms. If 
the sons of the founder do not trust each other to use their control rights in the interest of 
the firm, it can lead to a race to the bottom where one brother tries to tunnel resources out 
of the group firms before another brother can do so. 
 
To investigate whether these performance results can be explained by a 
deterioration in the governance structure of family groups with more sons, we first 
analyze whether families with more sons display a greater discrepancy between cash flow   14
and control rights, which provides incentives for tunneling. We construct several 
measures of the discrepancy between control and ownership for each of the firms in the 
groups covered in our sample. We follow the standard measures of excess control defined 
as the gap between total family ownership and total family control as calculated in Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). 
However, our data also allow us to also compute similar measures of excess control for 
each individual family member’s ownership and control rights within each of the group 
firm. Given the central role played by sons in the results above, it is of interest to contrast 
excess control by sons with excess control by other family members. 
 
In Table 7 we analyze whether groups become more pyramidal (i.e. larger excess 
control structures) if there are more family members (and in particular sons) especially 
once the founder is gone. While certainly not a proof of tunneling, such evidence would 
be consistent with greater incentives to tunnel. In Panel A of Table 7 we first regress the 
existence of family excess control (i.e. a dummy for whether total family control is larger 
than total family ownership) on number of sons, controlling for the number of 
generations the group has been in existence. As before this family excess control variable 
includes the holdings of all family members.  We find a positive, but only marginally 
significant relationship.  In column (2), we include the number of daughters in the 
regression and find no significant relationship between family excess control and number 
of daughters. However, we find a very different picture if we separate the groups where 
the founder is dead versus those where he is still alive. For those groups where the 
founder is dead we find a strongly positive relationship between the measure of family 
excess control and the number of sons in the firms (column 3). We do not find this 
relationship for the number of daughters (column 4). However, for groups where the 
founder is still present, this relationship is negative and significant (column 5). Again we 
do not find this result for the number of daughter (Column 6).  
 
We also replicate these results for the private and public firms within the groups, 
columns (7)-(10). We find that the sensitivity of family excess control to the number of 
sons is larger and more significant in public firms.  This indicates that more sons is 
associated with especially high tunneling incentives in publicly-traded firms, especially 
when the founder is gone. Of course though, because we do not directly measure 
tunneling, there are other possible interpretations for this finding. For example, this 
finding may also reflect a desire by founders to have each son manage a (more 
prestigious) publicly-traded firms, leading to an increase in the number of publicly-traded 
firms in the lower levels of the pyramidal structure.   
 
 
In Panel B we focus on excess control in the hands of the sons relative to the rest 
of the family. The dependent variable is a simple count of the number of sons with excess 
control. This measure of excess control allows us to understand whether sons in particular 
see an increase in excess control once the founder is dead. We find that families with 
more sons also have larger number of sons who have excess control (column1). However, 
when we include the number of daughters as an explanatory variable (column 2) we find 
a significant negative coefficient. This suggests that in families with more daughters,   15
daughters crowd out some of the excess control from the sons. However, the number of 
sons that have excess control is much larger for families where the founder is gone than 
where he is still alive (columns 3-6). In fact, the coefficient on the number of sons is 
about twice as large when the founder is gone (column 14) versus when he is still alive 
(column 16). And again, we find that the results are stronger for public firms than for 
private firms (columns 17-20).  
 
We also replicate the results using a measure of the average difference between 
control and ownership among sons at a given firm (Panel C, columns 21-30). We find 
that more sons are associated with a higher average difference between control and 
ownership for sons. The relationship is stronger when the founder is dead and stronger in 
the subset of publicly-traded firms. 
 
Overall, these results further suggest that the presence of more sons leads to a 
governance structure that is more pyramidal, which means that the gap between control 
and ownership rights is becoming more skewed in the hands of the sons. This allows for 
more "expropriation positions” for sons once the founder is gone. Moreover, if the trust 
relation between the sons is not strong, there are increased incentives for tunneling 
between the sons as they race to secure their part of the profits before one of the other 
brothers can tunnel it out. 
 
One should note that it is theoretically possible that an increase in the number of 
controlling shareholders might improve corporate governance. For example, Gomes and 
Novaes (2006) suggest that under certain conditions it is optimal for founders to share 
control with multiple outside shareholders to increase the value of the firm instead of just 
selling ownership stakes to outside shareholders. Their model assumes that under shared 
control each of the large shareholders has veto power against decisions that would reduce 
the value of their individual ownership stakes. This can enhance the overall value of the 
firm if private benefits are distributed unequally among controlling shareholders and 
projects with low public benefits but high private benefits can thus be blocked. Thus the 
critical difference between these results and our interpretation relies on the assumption 
that even controlling shareholders cannot exercise effective veto power if each controlling 
shareholder can tunnel resources from the firm unilaterally. In other words, the 
hypothesis we propose in the current paper relies on the idea that controlling shareholders 
cannot block each other’s transgression and thus engage in a race to the bottom. These 
types of misbehaviors become bigger when there are more sons involved as large 
shareholders.   While we admittedly cannot prove this assumption, we think it is a 
reasonable description of emerging markets where enforcement is weak.  In contrast we 
think that the board negotiation process described in Gomes and Novaes (2006) might be 
more representative of shareholder behavior in more developed capital markets. 
 
  In regressions not reported here, we also directly analyzed how the depth of 
business groups relates to family size. This analysis very much parallels the analysis 
performed in Table 7. We defined depth as being the maximum number of layers within a 
group separating a group firm from the firm(s) at the top of that group. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 6, with a mean of about 2. Not surprisingly given the results above, we   16
found that larger families are associated with deeper groups. In families where the 
founder is dead we see a strong positive relation between the number of sons and group 
depth. But there is a negative and barely significant relationship when the founder is still 
around. In other words, consistent with the results in Table 7, larger families are 
associated with deeper and more pyramidal group structures once the founder is dead.  
 
 
c.  Group Size and Diversification and Family Structure 
 
The above analysis suggests that the organizational and control structure of groups are 
importantly related to the size and composition of the family behind them, especially 
once the founder is dead. We now discuss possible relationship between family structure 
and other group characteristics. Specifically, we analyze whether the number of firms in a 
group and its level of industry concentration change when there are more sons in the 
group or the founder is dead. In Table 8, we regress these different group characteristics 
on our family structure variables. The regressions in this table are performed at the 
family-level. All regressions in this table include a control for the age of the group. 
 
The first dependent variable we consider is the number of firms in the group (as 
of 1996). Column (1) of Table 8 documents a positive and statistically significant 
correlation across families between the number of firms in the group and the number of 
sons in the family but not a significant relationship with the total number of family 
members. In column (2) we focus only on the families where the founder is dead and find 
that this positive relationship between the number of group firms and the number of sons 
is entirely driven by the those families where the founder is dead. Interestingly, neither 
family size not the number of sons is correlated with group size in families where the 
founder is still alive (column 3). In column (4)-(6), we repeat the previous regression but 
use the total assets as a dependent variable. We find that larger families are associated 
with larger total group assets; however, the effect is economically much smaller. 
Moreover, we do not find any relationship with the number of sons in the group. These 
combined results suggest that the average size of the firms within a group declines with 
the number of male family members. In other words the assets of the group tend to be 
divided into more separate firms with the number of sons in the family once the founder 
is gone.  
 
In columns (7)-(9), we also use the Herfindahl concentration index at the (Thai 
equivalent of) 2-digit SIC level as a dependent variable. We find that the industry 
concentration of a group declines when there are more sons in the family but only when 
the founder is gone. This result can be seen as a corollary to the previous result on the 
number of firms in a group, since a group can become more diversified when there are 





   17
d.  Firm Performance and Excess Control 
 
In a final step, we want to investigate whether there is a direct relationship 
between the performance of the group firms and the level of excess control by family 
members. If the poor performance of family firms after the founder’s departure is in part 
explained by the deteriorating governance due to the many sons that are vying for the 
group’s assets, we would expect that there should be a direct relationship between excess 
control and firm performance. Of course we need to be careful not to make any inference 
about the direction of causality from this analysis, since we showed above that both 
performance and governance are related to family structure. 
 
To investigate this question, in Panel A of Table 9 we first regress firm-level 
(residual) ROA on total family ownership in the firm and a dummy variable for excess 
family control (i.e., total family control is larger than total family ownership).
13 We use a 
control for the year the firm was established in all the regressions. Moreover we include 
family fixed effects in all regressions to control for fixed differences in the use of control 
between families. Across all groups, in column (1) we find a robust strong negative 
correlation between total family ownership and firm performance. Increased family 
involvement in ownership has a negative correlation with performance. This is in line 
with our prior findings in Table 7 that groups with larger families perform less well. We 
also find that higher excess control for the family overall is negatively correlated with 
residual ROA in the full sample, but the effect is not significant. When we repeat this 
regression for the groups where the founder is dead (column 3) and those where the 
founder is still around (column 5), we see that there is a significant negative relationship 
between family ownership and residual ROA once the founder is dead, but no such 
relationship when the founder is still alive. We also see that the coefficient on the excess 
family control is negative (but insignificant) when the founder is dead but positive when 
he is still alive.  
 
We now break out total family control and ownership into individual-specific 
measures of excess control. Specifically, we contrast the excess control in the hands of 
the sons with excess control of other family members. In column (2) we find a strong 
negative correlation between residual ROA and the measure of excess control of the sons, 
but no effect for the other family members.  Then we divide families into those where the 
founder is gone (column 4 of Panel A) versus those where the founder is still involved 
(column 6 of Panel A). We find a large and significant negative correlation between 
residual ROA and the measure of excess control between the sons when the founder is 
gone but no effect on the other family members. In contrast for those groups where the 
founder is still involved there is no significantly negative relationship between residual 
ROA and excess control of the sons. We find parallel results when we use the number of 
sons with excess control rather than the difference between the sons (not reported) but the 
coefficient estimates are not significant at traditional levels. 
 
                                                 
13 For the precise construction of the measure please see Appendix A. If there is excess control at 
the individual level, there is excess control at the family level.   18
One possible interpretation for the asymmetry we observe between sons and other 
family members is that it reflects on the differences in ownership stakes between sons 
and other family members. It might be that the gap between control and ownership of any 
shareholder (not only sons) reduced profitability but only when the degree of control is 
sufficiently large for this shareholder to be relevant.  We checked this possibility (results 
not reported) by creating a dummy variable that equals to 1 when sons’ ownership is 
more than 25% (0 otherwise) and another dummy variable that equals to 1 when other 
family members’ ownership is more than 25% (0 otherwise). We then interacted these 
dummy variables with sons’ excess control and others’ excess control, respectively. The 
results confirm that even when others own more than 25%, their excess control still does 
not matter for profitability. On the contrary, sons’ excess control matters both when their 
ownership is less than 25% and when their ownership is more than 25%.
14 Hence, it does 
appear that sons’ excess control differentially impact profitability than other family 
members’ excess control, even when these other family members also are relevant 
shareholders. 
 
These results are very striking. They indicate that excess control in the hands of 
sons is strongly negatively associated with firm performance but excess control in the 
hands of other family members does not have the same effect. This might suggest that 
potential governance abuses within family are not merely a function of the excess control 
rights a family member holds, but it is also determined by the person’s position within the 
family. A son of the founder might have greater freedom to use any excess control rights 
he holds to his benefit than other family members, even if they are in a similar position. 
This might give us an insight into the internal dynamics of the family and could suggest 
that there is a layer of governance or power structure within the family itself that affects 
the way family members can exercise their ownership and control rights within the 
family firms.  
  
Finally, in Panel B of Table 9 we run the same set of regressions we did in Panel 
A but now divide the sample into public and private firms. We find that the negative 
relationship between performance and excess control by sons is entirely driven by the 
private firms (contrast column 11 with column 13). For the public firms the relationship 
between firm performance and excess control by sons is actually positive and significant. 
If the public firms within the family group are important for the image of the family or 
even as a way for the sons to achieve liquidity of their ownership stakes, then the 
observed positive relationship for the public firms could be suggestive of the propping of 
public firms where sons hold excess control. Overall these findings reinforce a 
governance interpretation for our findings as we expect tunneling to be more prominent 
in the opaque private firms and propping in the more visible public firms.
15  
                                                 
14 We do find though that the negative effect of sons’ excess control on performance is stronger when their 
ownership is higher. 
15 At first glance, one could view these findings as inconsistent with the findings in Table 7, where we find 
a stronger relationship between excess control and number of sons in public firms than private firms. 
However, it is important to stress again that the analysis in Table 7 only captures tunneling incentives, and 
not tunneling opportunities or actual tunneling. A given level of incentives for tunneling in public firms   19
 
Overall, these findings suggest that not all family members may have the power 
or inclination to take advantage of their excess control position at group firms. Only 
excess control in the hands of sons appears to significantly hurt performance, and this is 
predominantly concentrated at private firms. In addition, the contrast between groups 
where the founder is no longer present and those where the founder is still alive suggests 
that the founder may have a disciplining effect on the sons' behavior. The fact that 
performance is negatively related to the number of sons with excess control suggests that 
the amount of distortion might be driven by competition between the sons over a given 
company's resources.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Families run a large fraction of firms around the world. Families themselves, 
however, are not monolithic entities but are composed of individual members, who may 
have different stakes and objectives in the family businesses. The current paper takes a 
first step in going beyond the case-study evidence to ask whether constraints imposed by 
family structure affect the corporate structure and ultimate performance of these family-
run firms. 
 
We show that the larger the family, in particular the more sons the founder has, 
the more positions within family firms are held by family members instead of outside 
managers and board members. We find, however, that the number of the sons of the 
founder a pivotal. Groups that are run by larger families (especially more sons) tend to 
have lower performance. All of these effects are especially pronounced in groups where 
the founder is no longer active and ultimate control has been passed on to an heir.  
 
Most interestingly, we analyze how the pyramidal ownership structure of group 
firms affects the performance of the firms. Firms where many sons of the founder 
indirectly own a fraction of the ownership show lower performance. This finding is 
consistent with an interpretation that having several sons with excess control can lead to a 
race to the bottom, where each son is trying to tunnel resources out of the company 
before his brother do the same. 
 
Overall, these findings provide novel evidence that wider family involvement in 
business groups alters business decisions and the performance of family-run firms. One 
hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that the decay of family-run groups over 
time may be due in part to increased incentives between family members to tunnel 
resources out of the firm as control becomes more diluted among different family 
members. A slightly different interpretation is that outright in-fighting for group 
resources leads to inefficient decision making. Conflicts between different parts of the 
family might lead to distortions in the governance structure and internal operations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
may not translate in as much opportunities for tunneling in these firms given the stronger external 
monitoring public firms are subject to.  
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these groups. These conflicts seem to be especially important once the founder has 
retired. 
 
One deeper question in this context is why families do not separate the control 
rights (i.e. management) more effectively from the ownership structure of the firm by 
placing management control in the hand of professionals but retaining ownership control 
within the family. Arrangements like this are widely used in many European countries 
where family firms are still prevalent, such as Italy or Germany. This would allow family 
members to fight over the cash flow streams, without distorting the efficiency of the 
business decisions within the firms. We conjecture that a potential answer to this question 
lies in the limited enforcement of contracts and market for governance in a country like 
Thailand. It could be that cash flow rights de facto can only be guaranteed in conjunction 
with control rights. Therefore, family members may have to stay directly involved in the 
operations of the business if they want to protect their cash flow rights. Our analysis 
suggests that individual family members may not only have to be concerned about 
expropriation by outsiders, but also expropriation by other (more powerful) family 
members. For example, the fact that weaker family members, such as daughters of the 
founder, are less likely to hold positions in firms where sons of the founder are also on 
board is quite suggestive in this regard. Similarly, our findings that larger families and 
larger family involvement are associated with a break down group assets into a larger set 
of (smaller) firms may also indicate that access to cash flow for a given family member 
requires control rights for that family member. 
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Appendix A: Construction of Excess Control Measures 
Individual ownership is calculated by summing a given family member's direct 
and indirect ownership over a given firm. Direct ownership is simply the percentage of 
shares that a given family member owns. When there is a chain shareholding along the 
pyramid, we also compute the indirect ownership along the chain by calculating the 
product of shares held by a given individual along the chain. The calculation is more 
complicated if there are more than one chain for each firm.  
 
In such case, the total indirect ownership is the sum of the ownership over all 
chains that can be traced back to the given family member. For example, Firm X is 30% 
owned by Mr. A, and 70% owned by firm Y. Firm Y is 40% owned by Mr. A. We say 
that Mr. A directly owns 30% of firm X. He also indirectly owns 40%*70% = 28% over 
firm X through firm Y along the pyramid chain. His ownership in firm X is therefore 
30+28 = 58%. 
Control is based on the voting rights a given family member has. Due to a one-
share-one-vote rule, direct control rights are simply the shares that the family member 
holds. However, in case of a chain shareholding, control over the voting rights of a firm 
is the weakest link, i.e., the smallest share along each chain. The total indirect control is 
defined as a sum of the control over all chains. Finally, ultimate control is the sum of 
direct and indirect control for each family member. Using the previous scenario, Mr. A 
directly controls 30% voting rights of firm X. He also indirectly controls min{40%, 70%} 
= 40% over firm X. His control in firm X is therefore 30+40 = 70%. 
Using this approach, we can define a measure of excess control (i.e., extent of control 
greater than or in excess of ownership stake) at the individual level. In the example 




Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Family Size 93 12.94 17.51 1 122
Number of Generations 93 2.47 0.72 1 5
Number of Male Family Members 93 9.06 10.28 1 69
Number of Female Family Members 93 5.88 8.08 0 51
Number of Sons 93 3.26 2.57 0 14
Number of Daughters 93 2.40 2.30 0 12
The unit of observation is a family. All the data are approximately as of 1996. Family size is
the total number of direct descendants of the founder of each business group, including the
founder himself. Specifically, family size does not include spouses, founder's siblings and
descendants of founder's siblings. Number of generations is defined as the number of
generations of the family from the founder (generation 1) to the latest generation that is active
in family business. Number of male family members is the total of number of direct
descendants of the founder, including the founder himself. Number of female family members
is the total number of direct descendants of the founder. Number of sons is the total number
of founder's sons from all wives. Number of daughters is the total number of founder's
daughters from all wives. Multiple wives is a dummy variable with the value of one if the
founder had more than one wives, and zero otherwise. Founder dead is a dummy variable
with the value of one if the founder was dead by 1996 and zero otherwise. The number of
observations in full sample is 93 families, except for multiple wives.
g
Multiple Wives 72 0.24 0.43 0 1




Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Firm Level
Panel A: The unit of observation is a firm. All data are as of 1996. Return on assets is the net profit divided by the
total assets at the end of the year. Leverage is group's total liabilities divided by group's total assets. Residual
return on assets is the residual from the OLS regression of return on assets on 1-digit SIC fixed effects and natural
logarithm of firm's total assets across all firms in the full sample, including firms not belonging to the 93 families.
Firm age is as of 1996.
Panel B: The unit of observation is a family business group. All data are as of 1996. Number of firms is the
number of public and private firms in our sample that belonged to families. Log of total assets is the natural
logarithm of group's total assets in thousand baht at the end of the year. Return on assets is the net profit divided by
the total assets at the end of the year. Leverage is group's total liabilities divided by group's total assets. Group age
is defined as the age of the oldest firm for each group in our sample. Group depth is defined as the maxumum
depth of the deepest firm in the group, where firm's maximum depth is the longest chain that vertically traces the
firm to family's ultimate ownership. Number of firms owning a particular firm is the largest number of group firms
that own a particular firm in the same group. Number of firms owned by a particular firm is the largest number of
group firms that are owned by a partucular firm in the same group. The total number of groups in full sample is 93.
When computing group stucture variables, two groups are dropped out due to their complicated structure of
cyclical cross-shareholdings.
Returns on Assets 586 0.03 0.07 -0.11 0.21
Residual Returns on Assets 586 0.10 7.25 -19.86 19.71
Leverage 586 0.71 0.25 0.21 1.10
Firm Age 586 18.06 13.57 0 114
Number of Firms 93 6.56 9.21 1 58
Number of Public Firms 93 1.90 2.58 0 19
Number of Private Firms 93 4.66 7.81 0 53
Log of Total Assets 93 16.43 1.77 12.54 21.22
Returns on Assets 93 0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.21
Leverage 93 0.69 0.18 0.29 1.10
Group Age 93 32.10 16.98 7 114
Group Depth 91 1.64 1.55 0 7
Number of Firms Owning a Particular Firm 91 1.57 1.67 0 7
Number of Firms Owned by a Particular Firm 91 2.33 3.94 0 23
Panel B: Group LevelTable 3: Summary Statistics of Family Involvements
The unit of observation is a family business group. For each observation, the variables are computed as the arithmetic
average across firms in the group. The data are as of 1996. The number of observations in full sample is 93 groups
(families) except for those for fraction of family board positions because some families do not hold any board
positions in some family-owned firms.
Family ownership is the total percentage of ultimate ownership directly or indirectly held by family members in a
particular firm. Number of family members with ownership is the number of family members that directly or
indirectly own a particular firm. Sons' ownership is the total percentage of ultimate ownership directly or indirectly
held by all founder's sons. Daughters' ownership is the total percentage of ultimate ownership directly or indirectly
held by all founder's daughters. Number of sons with ownership is the number of founder's sons that directly or
indirectly own a particular firm. Number of daughters with ownership is the number of founder's daughters that
directly or indirectly own a particular firm. Fraction of family ownership held by sons is computed as sons'
ownership divided by family ownership. Fraction of family ownership held by daughters is computed as daughters'
ownership divided by family ownership. Fraction of family ownership held by others is the fraction of family
ownership not held by founder's sons or daughters.
Number of family member with board position is the number of family member with board position in at least one of
the group firms. Number of sons with board position is the number of founder's sons with board position in at least
one of the group firms. Number of daughters with board position is the number of founder's daughters with board
position in at least one of the group firms. Fraction of board positions held by sons is computed as the number of
founder's sons on board divided by the number of all family members on board for a particular firm. Fraction of
board positions held by daughters is computed as the number of founder's daughters on board divided by the number
of all family members on board for a particular firm. Fraction of board positions held by others is computed as the
number of family board positions not held by founder's sons or daughters divided by the number of board positions




Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Family Ownership (%) 93 45.17 25.37 3.64 100.00
Number of Family Members with Ownership 93 6.23 4.82 1 36.57
Sons' Ownership (%) 93 12.61 15.52 0 63.08
Daughters' Ownership (%) 93 5.49 10.14 0 45.50
Number of Sons with Ownership 93 1.39 1.38 0 6
Number of Daughters with Ownership 93 0.81 1.11 0 5
Fraction of Family Ownership Held by Sons 93 0.28 0.28 0 1
Fraction of Family Ownership Held by Daughters 93 0.10 0.16 0 1
Fraction of Family Ownership Held by Others 93 0.62 0.33 0 1
Number of Family Members with Board Position 93 1.24 0.87 0 5
Number of Sons with Board Position 93 0.51 0.65 0 4
Number of Daughters with Board Position 93 0.10 0.25 0 1
Fraction of Family Board Positions Held by Sons 85 0.40 0.39 0 1
Fraction of Family Board Positions Held by Daughters 85 0.08 0.22 0 1
Fraction of Family Board Positions Held by Others 85 0.52 0.41 0 1
Panel A: Involvement in Ownership
Panel B: Involvement in Board Positions
held by any family members for a particular firm.Table 4 Family Involvement in Business Ownership
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family Size 0.241 0.243 -0.371 0.020
(0 086)*** (0 087)*** (0 196)* (0 085)
Sons Daughters
Fraction of Family Ownership (x 100) Held by: Number of Family Members 
with Ownership
The unit of observation is a firm. Number of family members with ownership is the number of family members that directly or indirectly own a particular firm.
Fraction of family ownership held by sons is computed as sons' ownership divided by family ownership. Fraction of family ownership held by daughters is
computed as daughters' ownership divided by family ownership. Fraction of family ownership held by others is the fraction of family ownership not heldb y
founder, his sons or his daughters. Family size is the total number of direct descendants of the founder of each business group, including the founder himself.
Founder dead is a dummy variable with the value of one if the founder was dead by 1996 and zero otherwise. Number of sons is the total number of founder's
sons from all wives. Number of daughters is the total number of founder's daughters from all wives. Number of others is family size minus number of sons and
number of daughters. Firm age is as of 1996. All regressions are estimated using OLS and controlled for number of generations fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at family-group level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * represents coefficients significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at
1%.
(0.086)*** (0.087)*** (0.196)* (0.085)
Founder Dead? (Yes=1) -0.605 20.372 20.499 -0.043 -0.454 -20.359
(1.285) (8.437)** (8.182)** (8.241) (8.514) (10.652)*
Number of Sons 2.651 2.140 3.542 0.268 -3.751
(1.390)* (1.398) (1.437)** (0.857) (1.407)***
Number of Daughters 0.369 0.370 0.174 1.066
(0.629) (0.601) (0.793) (1.617)
Number of Others 0.291
(0.231)
Firm Age 0.034 0.036 0.044 -0.006 -0.003 0.133 0.133 0.134 -0.119
(0.024) (0.025) (0.107) (0.098) (0.096) (0.067)* (0.066)** (0.067)** (0.119)
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.498 1.787 20.258 11.388 13.191 4.091 4.111 3.438 82.220
(1.704) (1.597) (8.626)** (7.423) (7.543)* (2.978) (5.826) (6.070) (9.506)***
Observations 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521 521
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.41
Number of Families 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93Table 5 Family Involvement in Board Positions
Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family Size 0.013 0.014 -0.746 -0.145
Number of Family Members 
with Board Position
Fraction of Family's Board Positions (x 100) Held by:
Sons Daughters
The unit of observation is a firm. Number of family member with board position is the number of family member with board position in a given firm. Fractiono f
board positions held by sons is computed as the number of founder's sons on board divided by the number of all family members on board for a particular firm.
Fraction of board positions held by daughters is computed as the number of founder's daughters on board divided by the number of all family members on board
for a particular firm. Fraction of board positions held by others is computed as the number of family board positions not held by founder, his sons or his daughters
divided by the number of board positions held by any family members for a particular firm. Family size is the total number of direct descendants of the founder of
each business group, including the founder himself. Founder dead is a dummy variable with the value of one if the founder was dead by 1996 and zero otherwise.
Number of sons is the total number of founder's sons from all wives. Number of daughters is the total number of founder's daughters from all wives. Numbero f
others is family size minus number of sons and number of daughters. Firm age is as of 1996. All regressions are estimated using OLS and controlled for number
of generations fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at family-group level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * represents coefficients significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.242)*** (0.077)*
Founder Dead? (Yes=1) -0.174 3.474 4.778 2.026 2.655 -6.636
(0.237) (9.438) (8.698) (6.045) (5.947) (10.384)
Number of Sons 3.821 3.753 6.551 -7.011
(1.278)*** (1.303)*** (1.494)*** (1.287)***
Number of Daughters 1.026 1.003 1.521 1.993
(0.359)*** (0.369)*** (0.511)*** (1.245)
Number of Others 0.702
(0.255)***
Firm Age 0.020 0.020 0.062 0.058 0.049 0.038 0.036 0.036 -0.064
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.114) (0.113) (0.123) (0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.118)
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.424 0.507 24.394 22.634 26.607 1.545 0.415 1.713 71.414
(0.155)*** (0.231)** (6.646)*** (8.163)*** (7.516)*** (1.980) (4.603) (4.632) (8.977)***
Observations 580 580 323 323 323 323 323 323 323
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.29
Number of Families 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93Table 6 Firm Performance and Family Stucture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family Size -0.043 0.000 0.014 0.016 0.023 0.017 -0.530 -0.136
(0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.425) (0.791)
Number of Sons -0.340 -0.473 -0.284 -0.483 -0.334 0.348 0.117
(0.156)** (0.132)*** (0.160)* (0.114)*** (0.151)** (0.797) (0.948)
Sons from Different Wives -0.386 -0.402 4.649
(0.802) (0.681) (2.828)
Number of Daughters -0.216 -0.145 -0.291
(0.108)** (0.085)* (0.821)
Dependent Variable: Residual ROA (x 100)
All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive
The unit of observation is a firm. Residual return on assets is the residual from the OLS regression of return on assets on 1-digit SIC fixed effects and natural logarithm of
firm's total assets across all firms in the full sample, including firms not belonging to the 93 families. Number of sons is the total number of founder'ss o n sf r o ma l lw i v e s .
Sons from different wives is a dummy variable with value of one if there are founder's sons from different founder's wives, and zero otherwise. Number of daughters is
the total number of founder's daughters from all wives. Firm age is as of 1996. All regressions are estimated using OLS and controlled for number of generations fixed
effect. Contants are included but not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at family-group level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * represents coefficients
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
Firm Age 0.026 0.024 0.036 0.022 0.049 0.048 0.001 -0.052
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)* (0.020) (0.021)** (0.021)** (0.063) (0.060)
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 507 586 309 337 198 249
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.02
Number of Families 93 93 93 93 37 45 33 48
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Family Size 0.068 0.068 -0.025 -0.023
(0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.035) (0.037)
Number of Sons -0.393 -0.279 -0.427 -0.231
(0.166)** (0.225) (0.180)** (0.195)
Sons from Different Wives -1.711 0.376
(1.303) (1.138)
Number of Dauthers -0.129 -0.191
(0.200) (0.150)
Firm Age 0.022 0.013 0.032 0.019
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151 169 356 417
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
Number of Families 52 62 55 75
Public PrivateTable 7 Excess Control and Family Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number of Sons 0.013 0.012 0.021 0.027 -0.057 -0.057 0.026 0.025 0.010 0.006
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.013)* (0.015)* (0.008) (0.010)
Number of Daughters 0.003 -0.010 0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 337 337 249 249 169 169 417 417
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.03
Number of Families 93 93 45 45 48 48 62 62 75 75
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Family Control > Family Ownership? (Yes=1)
All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive Public Private
The unit of observation is a firm. "Family Control > Family Ownership" is a dummy variable with the value of one if family has voting rights more than
its cash flow rights. See text for detail. "Number of Sons with Control > Ownership" is the number of founder's sons whose voting rights greater than cash
flow rights. Difference in sons' control and ownership is the average difference between voting rights and control rights across founder's sons. Number of
sons is the total number of founder's sons from all wives. Number of daughters is the total number of founder's daughters from all wives. All regressions
are estimated using OLS and controlled for number of generations fixed effect. Contants are included but not reported here. Standard errors are in
parentheses. * represents coefficients significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Number of Sons 0.264 0.326 0.259 0.342 0.126 0.147 0.398 0.458 0.223 0.264
(0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.039)*** (0.046)*** (0.051)*** (0.030)*** (0.035)***
Number of Daughters -0.116 -0.143 -0.135 -0.133 -0.074
(0.029)*** (0.040)*** (0.037)*** (0.052)** (0.035)**
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 337 337 249 249 169 169 417 417
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.05 0.10 0.51 0.53 0.26 0.27
Number of Families 93 93 45 45 48 48 62 62 75 75
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
Number of Sons 0.501 0.895 0.348 0.834 0.764 0.865 0.981 1.306 0.347 0.711
(0.119)*** (0.137)*** (0.159)** (0.191)*** (0.168)*** (0.164)*** (0.210)*** (0.230)*** (0.143)** (0.169)***
Number of Daughters -0.741 -0.836 -0.649 -0.727 -0.655
(0.135)*** (0.190)*** (0.156)*** (0.232)*** (0.169)***
Number of Generations F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 337 337 249 249 169 169 417 417
R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.09 0.12
Number of Families 93 93 45 45 48 48 62 62 75 75
Founder Alive Public Private
All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive Public Private
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Number of Sons with Control > Ownership
Panel C: Dependent Variable = Difference in Sons' Control and Ownership
All Firms Founder DeadTable 8 Group Size, Industry Concentration, Organization Structure and Family Size
All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Family Size 0.079 0.056 0.007 2.469 2.212 -1.989 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.050) (0.068) (0.194) (1.324)* (1.995) (3.325) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
Number of Sons 0.548 1.336 -0.408 2.403 7.475 3.216 -0.002 -0.031 0.040
(0.314)* (0.523)** (0.414) (8.369) (15.443) (7.094) (0.012) (0.015)** (0.030)
GA 0 096 0 086 0 084 2 113 2 279 1 150 0 004 0 004 0 004
Total Assets (Millions Baht) Industry Concentration (2-Digit SIC) Number of Firms
The unit of observation is a family business group. Number of firms is the number of public and private firms in our sample that belonged to a given family.T o t a l
asset is group's total assets in million baht. Industry concentration is computed as the squareroot of the summation of the squares of the fraction of group's assets
in each industry to total group's assets in all industries. Specifically, the concentration index equals to one if the group is concentrated in only on industry.
Industries are classified approximately at 2-digit SIC. Family size is the total number of direct descendants of the founder of each business group, including the
founder himself. Number of sons is the number of founder's sons. Group age is defined as the age of the oldest firm for each group in our sample. All regressions
are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses. * represents coefficients significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. The total
number of groups in full sample is 91. Two groups are dropped out due to their complicated structure of cyclical cross-shareholdings.
Group Age 0.096 0.086 0.084 2.113 2.279 1.150 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.047)** (0.073) (0.047)* (1.266)* (2.144) (0.806) (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.003)
Constant 0.121 -1.610 3.212 -45.623 -59.297 2.291 0.849 0.929 0.747
(1.717) (3.194) (1.440)** (45.748) (94.322) (24.672) (0.065)*** (0.093)*** (0.104)***
Number of Observations 91 44 47 91 44 47 91 44 47
R-squared 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.13Table 9 Firm Performance, Family Ownership and Excess Control
Dependent Variable: Residual ROA (x 100)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family Ownership -0.036 -0.036 -0.050 -0.045 -0.011 -0.020
(0.016)** (0.015)** (0.018)*** (0.018)** (0.030) (0.026)
Family Control > Family Ownership? (Yes=1) -1.059 -2.308 1.134
(1.148) (1.496) (1.533)
Difference in Sons' Control and Ownership -0.168 -0.167 -0.344
(0.049)*** (0.052)*** (0.265)
Difference in Others' Control and Ownership 0 023 0 026 0 035
All Firms Founder Dead Founder Alive
The unit of observation is a firm. Residual return on assets is the residual from the OLS regression of return on assets on 1-digit SIC fixed effects and natural logarithm
of firm's total assets across all firms in the full sample, including firms not belonging to the 93 families. Family ownership is the total percentage of ultimate ownership
directly or indirectly held by family members in a particular firm. "Family Control > Family Ownership" is a dummy variable with the value of one if family has voting
rights more than its cash flow rights. See text for detail. Difference in sons' control and ownership is the average difference between voting rights and control rights
across founder's sons. Difference in others' control and ownership is the average difference between voting rights and control rights across family members except for
founder's sons. All regressions are estimated using OLS and controlled for family fixed effect. Contants are included but not reported here. Standard errors are
clustered at family-group level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * represents coefficients significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%.
Difference in Others Control and Ownership 0.023 0.026 0.035
(0.051) (0.096) (0.073)
Famiy F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 586 586 337 337 249 249
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.36 0.36
Number of Families 93 93 45 45 48 48
Dependent Variable: Residual ROA (x 100)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Family Ownership -0.044 -0.028 -0.029 -0.030
(0.051) (0.045) (0.020) (0.018)*
Family Control > Family Ownership ? -1.245 -1.091
(2.772) (1.497)
Difference in Sons' Control and Ownership 0.203 -0.202
(0.078)** (0.060)***
Difference in Others' Control and Ownership -0.255 0.047
(0.142)* (0.055)
Famiy F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 169 169 417 417
R-squared 0.51 0.53 0.26 0.28
Number of Families 62 62 75 75
Public PrivateTable A1 Family Characteristics
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
1 5 122 3 2 1 1 48 27 4 2 0 1
2 49 9 6 6 1 1 49 27 4 2n . a . 1
3 43 4 6 1 1 1 50 27 4 2 0 0
4 43 3 5 2 0 1 51 27 2 4 0 0
5 42 7 4 2 0 1 52 27 2 4 0 1
6 42 5 1 2 0 1 53 26 5 0n . a . 0
7 42 1 5 5 0 1 54 26 4 1 0 0
8 42 0 3 0 1 1 55 26 3 2 0 0
9 35 9 1 4 1 2 1 1 56 26 3 2 0 1
10 33 8 8 2 0 1 57 26 3 2 0 0
11 33 4 8 4 1 1 58 26 3 2 0 0
12 32 9 5 4 0 1 59 26 2 3 0 0
13 32 5 5 3 1 1 60 26 2 3 0 0
14 32 3 1 0 0 n . a . 0 61 26 1 4 0 0




















The unit of observation is a family. Family numbers are ranked by number of generations, family size and number of sons, respectively. All the data 
are approximately as of 1996. Family size is the total number of direct descendants of the founder of each business group, including the founder 
himself. Specifically, family size does not include spouses, founder's siblings and descendants of founder's siblings. Number of generations is defined 
as the number of generations of the family from the founder (generation 1) to the latest generation that is active in family business. Number of sons is 
the total number of founder's sons from all wives. Number of daughters is the total number of founder's daughters from all wives. Multiple wives is a 
dummy variable with the value of one if the founder had more than one wives, and zero otherwise. Founder dead is a dummy variable with the value 
of one if the founder was dead by 1996 and zero otherwise.
16 31 9 4 8 1 1 63 25 4 0n . a . 0
17 31 7 7 4 1 1 64 25 4 0n . a . 0
18 31 6 6 1 0 0 65 25 3 1 0 0
19 31 6 2 1 0 1 66 25 3 1 0 1
20 31 5 6 6 n . a . 1 67 25 3 1 0 1
21 31 5 6 5 0 0 68 25 3 0 0 1
22 31 5 3 0 0 1 69 25 2 2n . a . 0
23 31 4 2 3 0 0 70 25 2 2 0 0
24 31 3 2 2 0 1 71 25 1 3 0 0
25 31 2 5 4 1 1 72 25 1 3n . a . 0
26 31 2 2 2 0 1 73 25 1 3 0 0
27 31 2 1 6 0 1 74 24 3 0n . a . 0
28 31 1 4 0 n . a . 1 75 24 3 0 0 0
29 31 1 3 1 0 1 76 24 2 1 0 0
30 31 1 2 4 0 1 77 24 2 1 1 0
31 31 1 1 0 0 1 78 24 1 2 0 0
32 31 1 0 2 0 1 79 24 1 2 0 1
33 31 0 4 3 0 0 80 24 1 2 0 0
34 38 2 4n . a . 081 24 1 2 0 1
35 37 3 2 0 182 24 1 2 0 0
36 36 3 0n . a . 183 24 0 2 0 0
37 35 1 0n . a . 184 23 2 0n . a . 0
38 22 0 8 1 0 0 0 85 23 1 1 0 0
39 21 6 9 5 0 0 86 23 1 1 0 1
40 21 3 1 0 2 1 1 87 22 1 0n . a . 0
41 21 2 4 7 1 0 88 22 1 0 0 0
42 21 1 4 1 1 0 89 21 0 0n . a . 1
43 21 1 4 3 0 0 90 21 0 0n . a . 1
44 21 0 4 2 1 0 91 21 0 0n . a . 0
45 29 4 4 1 192 11 0 0n . a . 0
46 28 4 3n . a . 093 11 0 0n . a . 0
47 28 2 5 1 0Table A2 Group Characteristics
All Public Private Owning Owned All Public Private Owning Owned
1 8 4 4 18.25 1.03 0.90 63 4 3 3 48 8 4 4 19.05 2.99 0.71 67 3 3 3
2 14 7 7 20.34 2.00 0.89 64 4 4 7 49 2 0 2 14.44 10.62 0.68 7 2 1 0
3 18 7 11 21.22 1.43 0.74 52 5 6 11 50 5 0 5 18.60 -0.27 0.33 55 2 3 3
4 25 1 24 18.23 7.34 0.65 44 3 3 11 51 1 0 1 14.74 4.88 1.10 18 0 0 0
5 22 6 16 17.90 3.79 0.65 114 3 2 8 52 9 4 5 19.95 1.73 0.89 51 6 7 6
6 2 1 1 15.42 2.69 0.57 66 0 0 0 53 1 0 1 15.68 -0.13 0.87 28 0 0 0
7 4 1 3 17.76 -0.01 0.92 49 3 1 1 54 13 6 7 16.87 4.71 0.41 27 3 4 12
8 5 0 5 17.12 9.10 0.65 63 1 1 3 55 10 1 9 19.75 -0.32 0.29 27 4 4 6
9 31 6 25 18.43 1.56 0.69 39 4 2 6 56 1 1 0 14.50 -1.37 0.66 27 0 0 0
10 35 19 16 17.90 3.75 0.52 44 7 5 23 57 2 1 1 15.11 12.03 0.49 23 1 1 1
11 4 0 4 16.21 -0.71 0.96 31 2 6 2 58 4 3 1 16.56 4.63 0.55 11 2 1 3
12 1 1 0 15.11 8.54 0.53 27 0 0 0 59 3 2 1 14.41 4.54 0.58 26 0 0 0
13 9 1 8 16.48 2.11 0.68 38 3 3 4 60 58 5 53 20.28 1.14 0.91 62
14 1 0 1 15.63 0.10 1.05 46 0 0 0 61 7 2 5 16.55 7.33 0.64 31 2 1 2
15 4 0 4 15.02 0.44 0.93 54 1 1 0 62 6 2 4 16.13 2.42 0.62 26 2 5 2
16 46 7 39 19.19 0.78 0.60 29 5 7 21 63 1 1 0 15.70 1.13 0.79 23 0 0 0





















Number of Firms Number of Firms Number of 
The unit of observation is a family business group. All data are as of 1996. Family numbers correspond to those assigned in Table A1. Number of firms is the number of public and private firms in our sample 
that belonged to families. Log of total assets is the natural logarithm of group's total assets in thousand baht at the end of the year. Return on assets is the net profit divided by the total assets at the end of the 
year. Leverage is group's total liabilities divided by group's total assets. Group age is defined as the age of the oldest firm for each group in our sample. Group depth is defined as the maxumum depth of the 
deepest firm in the group, where firm's maximum depth is the longest chain that vertically traces the firm to family's ultimate ownership. Number of firms owning a particular firm is the largest number of 
group firms that own a particular firm in the same group. Number of firms owned by a particular firm is the largest number of group firms that are owned by a partucular firm in the same group.
17 11 1 10 17.90 5.71 0.73 29 4 2 6 64 3 0 3 13.70 -0.25 0.89 27 1 1 0
18 8 0 8 16.34 0.83 0.90 20 1 1 1 65 6 5 1 17.88 3.60 0.61 31 1 1 3
19 4 4 0 17.16 0.97 0.83 29 2 1 1 66 6 2 4 18.30 5.80 0.58 16 4 1 3
20 4 0 4 15.73 7.74 0.54 33 1 1 0 67 2 0 2 14.59 -0.05 0.74 30 1 1 1
21 2 2 0 18.16 1.38 0.57 28 1 1 0 68 3 1 2 14.27 8.15 0.53 8 1 1 1
22 3 3 0 17.05 -1.27 0.75 8 0 0 0 69 7 0 7 15.70 -1.07 0.78 33 1 1 0
23 7 1 6 17.46 3.95 0.61 41 5 2 3 70 2 1 1 15.25 0.40 0.46 32 2 2 1
24 3 2 1 15.51 6.33 0.59 26 1 1 0 71 1 0 1 13.58 1.09 0.69 27 0 0 0
25 2 2 0 15.46 -4.25 0.72 16 1 1 1 72 13 3 10 17.99 -1.68 0.81 33 2 2 4
26 4 1 3 16.13 5.87 0.60 32 3 2 1 73 1 1 0 15.27 3.30 0.49 25 0 0 0
27 2 0 2 15.72 9.28 0.39 35 1 1 0 74 4 2 2 15.34 11.84 0.51 15 2 1 1
28 8 0 8 16.22 5.77 0.67 24 2 2 3 75 2 0 2 14.31 6.41 0.59 17 1 1 0
29 2 2 0 16.50 3.44 0.68 23 0 0 0 76 4 4 0 16.38 0.48 0.62 34 1 1 3
30 2 0 2 13.53 0.58 0.69 48 2 1 1 77 2 0 2 15.39 -1.62 0.87 19 1 0 1
31 1 1 0 12.92 4.45 0.40 18 0 0 0 78 3 1 2 16.60 8.20 0.72 13 0 0 0
32 4 0 4 15.85 -3.51 1.00 22 1 1 2 79 2 2 0 15.15 -5.22 0.48 23 0 0 0
33 7 1 6 16.16 20.86 0.30 29 1 1 3 80 5 4 1 16.86 2.69 0.40 26 1 4 1
34 3 2 1 16.75 -11.11 0.90 24 3 2 2 81 1 0 1 13.22 0.63 0.77 17 0 0 0
35 17 3 14 17.48 1.66 0.59 43 4 4 1 82 8 4 4 17.84 11.99 0.43 13 2 1 4
36 3 1 2 16.17 7.69 0.58 44 0 0 0 83 2 0 2 15.73 2.38 0.72 22 1 1 1
37 4 0 4 17.12 4.84 0.56 34 84 4 2 2 17.48 0.88 0.91 24 1 1 3
38 3 2 1 17.25 0.48 0.80 37 1 1 1 85 16 4 12 17.47 1.03 0.73 35 3 3 8
39 1 0 1 13.52 0.89 0.96 7 0 0 0 86 1 1 0 18.60 0.91 0.90 47 0 0 0
40 4 2 2 18.70 1.31 0.91 57 2 4 2 87 4 4 0 16.69 -1.35 0.69 43 1 1 2
41 2 0 2 14.92 0.01 0.83 18 0 0 0 88 3 3 0 17.76 0.07 0.82 26 2 2 1
42 4 2 2 16.12 4.74 0.58 17 2 1 2 89 5 1 4 17.39 0.25 0.90 47 2 2 1
43 2 1 1 15.81 5.87 0.69 32 1 2 0 90 1 0 1 13.69 1.71 0.69 23 0 0 0
44 2 0 2 13.47 0.51 0.47 10 1 1 0 91 7 3 4 17.32 4.80 0.60 23 2 2 3
45 1 0 1 15.69 0.73 0.43 21 0 0 0 92 7 2 5 16.81 0.55 0.83 38 2 2 1
46 3 0 3 17.47 -0.16 0.97 54 2 4 1 93 1 1 0 12.54 -11.20 1.10 11 0 0 0
47 1 0 1 15.66 0.60 0.95 16 0 0 0  1




A. Firm Data 
 
A.1 Data Sources 
 
Our firm-level data are from Thailand. Each registered firm in Thailand has to submit annual 
financial statements, audited by an authorized auditor, to the Ministry of Commerce. Registered 
firms include registered partnerships, privately held limited companies, and publicly traded 
companies. The database is physically assembled and maintained by the Ministry’s Department 
of Business Development.
1 We access this database in several ways 
 
(1) Direct request made to the Department of Business Development The Department 
makes the database available to general public upon request. The database contains all the 
information each firm submits to the Ministry. For each firm, the information include the 
registration number, registration date, address, name of the firm, notes on change of status or 
change of names, types of business, the report of the shareholder meetings, financial statements, 
list of shareholders (names, nationality, profession, number of shares, date of acquire or 
purchase), and list of the directors. The coverage is all registered firms in Thailand for all 
available years. The data is not digitalized and must be requested on firm-by-firm basis based 
only on the registration number. The request must be made in person. Fees are charged based on 
the number of firms, the number of years and the type of the requested data. 
 
(2)  Thailand Company Information (TCI) The Department of Business Development 
gives a right to Advanced Research Group Co., Ltd. to publish the financial statements of 
approximately top 2,000 registered firms in a series of books called Thailand Company 
Information  (TCI). The books are released annually since 1987. The TCI database contains 
financial, ownership and board composition information at the firm-level. For all firms, the 
financial information includes total assets, total liabilities, total revenues and net profits. 
Ownership data report the names of the shareholders and the percentage of company shares 
directly held by each shareholder. The database includes information of the names of directors on 
the firm’s board. For publicly traded firms, specific positions on the board a particular person 
holds are also reported. The database provides information on industry classification similar to 1-
digit and 2-digit SIC codes, and founding year for each firm. All data in TCI are translated into 
English. 
 
(3) Business Online (BOL) The Department of Business Development also cooperates 
with Business Online Public Co., Ltd. to digitalize the basic information of over 600,000 
registered companied in Thailand. The information includes company’s name, registration 
number, address, financial statement, list of shareholders and directors. As BOL was established 
in 1996, the database contains only information in recent years. (At the time of working on our 
project, the BOL financial data goes back to 1993 while the shareholder and director information 
is back only to 1997.) The data is available for purchase in digital format. The price is based on 
the number of firms, the number of years and type of the data. Most of the data are in English, 
except for shareholder and director information, which is mostly in Thai. 
                                                 
1 The Department of Business Development was previously known as the Department of Commercial 
Registration until the government reorganization that became effective in October 2002.   2
 
(4) Listed Company Info (SET) In addition to submitting the annual report to the Ministry 
of Commerce, all the listed firms must summit the same report and additional data to the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET). The data that SET makes available to the investors and generally 
public include company profile, quarterly consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements, 
daily trading information, announcement and news, among others. The data was digital and came 
in a series of CD-ROMs. Recently, the Stock Exchange of Thailand changed the format of 
the data from CD-ROM to online access. Unfortunately, the online access contains only 
the data for the past 5 years. All the data is in English. 
 
 
A.2 Construction of Firm Dataset  
 
We construct our dataset from several sources listed above. We start by taking the list of firms 
directly from Thailand Company Information 1997-1998, which publishes the financial data for 
the end of 1996. The criteria that TCI used in selecting the firms to be included is that the firm 
must either (1) have annual revenues of at least 200 million Baht (approximately eight million US 
dollars), (2) are listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, or (3) are one of the leading companies 
in its industry. In total, there are 2,153 firms included in TCI’s 1996 list. All of these firms form 
our sample for 1996. Our 1996 sample therefore includes all publicly traded firms and the largest 
privately held firms in Thailand. For all firms, we get the general firm’s profiles (registration 
number, name, type of business and founding year) from TCI 1997-1998 books. 
 
  The 1996 information on shareholders, board of directors and financial statements come 
from two sources. For non-listed firms, we rely on the TCI books for all of these data as it was the 
only source available except for the direct request from the Department of Business 
Development. However, for listed firms, we get the data from SET’s Listed Company Info CD-
ROMs because the data is digitalized and it distinguishes between consolidated and 
unconsolidated financial statements. We use unconsolidated financial statements in our analysis. 
 
 
B. Family Data 
 
B.1 Data Sources 
 
Our objective is to construct family trees for the family groups in our sample that are as accurate 
and comprehensive as possible. For that purpose we rely on a number of sources. We start with 
information from a publication by the Brooker Group entitled Thai Business Groups: A Unique 
Guide to Who Owns What. This book identifies the 150 leading business groups in Thailand and 
covers the history of each of these groups since the time the first business was founded until 
today. The next step is constructing family trees of these business families listed in the Brooker 
book. Specifically, for each of the family business groups, we identify its founder and try to trace 
all of his direct descendants to the youngest active generation. To make the definition on family 
size consistent across families, we do not count the siblings and their descendants as a part of the 
family when we compute the family size because this set of information is incomplete for many 
families. However, the information is useful when we analyze the involvement of family 
members in family business so we still collect the information on the founder’s siblings and their 
descendents whenever possible. We also ignore family members that are younger than 15 in the   3
late 1990s by including in our family tree only individuals with Mr., Mrs., Miss, Lady 
(Thanpuying and Khunying), Dr., or military titles.
2 
 
Although the Booker book helps us identify the prominent business family and construct 
some family trees, it does not provide systematic information on the full family trees of all the 
families. We therefore gather more detailed descriptions of the business families from several 
alternative sources. The most useful source is from various biography books written on several 
Thai millionaires. For example, Sapphaibul (2001a, b) provide impressive information on 55 of 
the most famous business families. In addition, it is customary in Thailand when a public person 
dies that the descendants compile a funeral book that contains information about the person's life 
and his or her family relationships. When available, we also collect the family tree information 
from the funeral books published and distributed for the group founders or other family members. 
Next, we supplement the information from books with articles from various local Magazine and 
newspapers. These articles are usually either a story about a famous family or an interview with a 
group founder or his descendants. The full list of the biography and funeral books as well as 
articles is at the end of this appendix. We also collect a number of small news clips from social 
columns in several daily newspapers. Most of these news clips are on engagement announcement, 
wedding, divorce, death, funeral arrangement, obituary, and anniversary celebration. Finally, we 
conducted informal interviews with family members of a few business families to verify the 
accuracy of our data. 
 
 
B.2 Construction of Family Dataset 
 
With the descriptive information we gather from several sources, we code the 
information systematically. We include in our family trees all of the family members we identify, 
whether or not they are involved in the family business. The founder generation is coded as 
generation one, his children are generation two, and so on. For each family member, we collect 
information on their specific position in the family tree (defined as the relationship to the 
founder), gender, birth order (defined as the rank order of children within a specific marriage), 
and biological vs. adopted status. With less coverage and accuracy, we also code the information 
on individual education, working experiences, and involvement in family business. We also relied 
on these sources to identify which specific family members, if any, had been designated as “heir" 
of the family business. Note that we cannot systematically track whether a given family member 
in our family tree is still alive or not. However, we do know for all families whether the founder 
is still alive or not as of 1996. 
 
Finally, for each family member, we collect the information on the name of the spouse(s) 
whenever possible. This information will be especially interesting for the founders, since several 
of them have multiple wives and also children from multiple wives. We do not, however, count 
spouses as part of the family when we construct measures of family size. We carefully keep track 
of changes in last names, especially for married female family members and her descendants. 
(More details below.) We also gather the information on relationships across families through 
marriages. 
 
  As a whole, we construct family trees for 93 business families. Ninety four of them are 
among the Brooker’s list; three of them are additional. By alphabetical order, the families 
included in our data are Asadathorn, Asavabhokin, Assakul, Bencharongkul, Bhirom Bhakdi, 
Bodiratnangkura, Boondicharern, Boonnamsap, Boonsoong, Bulakul, Bulsook, Chaiyawan, 
                                                 
2 In Thailand, a person drops his or her junior title and starts using Mr. or Miss when he or she turns 15.   4
Chansiri, Chansrichwala, Charnvirakul, Chearavanont, Chirathivat, Chokwatana, Chotitawan, 
Darakananda, Dumnernchanvanit, Hetrakul, Horrungruang, Jantaranukul, Jungrungruangkit, 
Kanathanavanich, Karnasuta, Karnchanachari, Karnchanapas, Kiangsiri, Kitiparaporn, 
Krisdathanont, Kunanantakul, Kuvanant, Lailert/YipInTsoi/Chutrakul, Lamsam, Laohathai, Lee-
Issaranukul, Leelaprachakul, Leelasithorn, Leenutaphong, Leeswadtrakul, Leophairatana, 
Lertsumitrkul, Mahadumrongkul, Mahagitsiri, Maleenont, Nakornsri, Narongdej, Nithivasin, 
Osathanugrah, Phaoenchoke, Phatraprasit, Phenjati, Phodhivorakhun, Phongsathorn, 
Phornprapha, Piyaoui, Poolvoralaks, Prasarttong-Osot, Raiva/Sila-on, Ratanarak, 
Sermsirimongkol, Shinawatra, Sirivadhanabhakdi, Sophonpanich, Srifuengfung, Sriorathaikul, 
Srivikorn, Sukosol, Supsakorn, Suriyasat, Tangkaravakoon, Tangmatitham, Tantipipatpong, 
Tantipong-anant, Techaruvichit, Tejapaibul, Tejavibul, Tuchinda, Uahwatanasakul, Umpujh, 
Vacharaphol, Vanich, Vilailuck, Viraporn, Viriyabhan, Viriyaprapaikit, Vongvanij, Wanglee, 
Wattanavekin, Wongkusolkit, and Yoovidhaya. The main characteristics of each family are 
shown in Table A1. 
 
 
B.3 Matching Family Data with Firm Data 
 
The next task is putting the firm data and the family data together. First, we match the 
names listed as shareholders and directors to the names listed in our constructed family 
trees. It is very common that a Thai name is translated into different versions of English 
spelling so we pay a significant attention when we match the names. 
 
Next, for the firms belonging to our 93 families, we identify firms that belong to 
each of our 93 business families. The criterion is that the family as a whole has the 
highest percentage of ultimate ownership in that company. Ultimate ownership is defines 
as the cash-flow rights derived from holding shares in the firm directly or indirectly 
through pyramids or cross-shareholdings. The main characteristics of each family business 
group are shown in Table A2. 
 
Note that we are very careful in matching female family members by looking at 
both their current last name and their maiden name. Specifically, to alleviate the concern 
that a female family member may change her last name after marriage, we match the 
female names in two steps: 
 
First Step: Starting with the family trees, we match the records where both the first name 
and the last name are perfectly identical (after correcting for various ways of spelling the same 
Thai names in English). Out of 4,408 records of ownership, 3,269 individual names and last 
names (74.16%) were matched in this first stage. Note that we considered both the original last 
name of the individual and the last name of her husband. Out of 232 daughters in our family trees, 
102 have husband's last name. Obviously, we may miss some of the last names, but it is also 
likely that some of those daughters without husband's last name were indeed not married, and 
when they got married the last name in the firm database at the Ministry of Commerce may not 
get updated. We address this concern in the second step. 
   5
Second Step: For each of the names in the family tree that were not matched in the first 
step, we check whether it could have been due to the change in last name. Specifically, we 
perform a match between family tree and firm records just based on first names. We can 
confidently apply this strategy since it is extremely rare in the Thai culture to give the same first 
name to more than one person within the same family. This is done for each of the families. There 
is only one case where we found the same first name in the family tree and firm records, but 
different last names. For this particular one case, we do not consider this person as a family 
member. 
Given the very small number (e.g. one) of cases we identify under step 2, we are quite 
confident that our name matching covers most of the family members listed in our family trees 
and there is no systematic bias between male and female family members in the matching 
process. 
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